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Foreword for Regulation in the Fringe 
Economy Symposium 
John P. Caskey* 
The timing of this symposium could not be better. The economy of 
the United States is still suffering the consequences of a financial crisis 
that had its origins in lax mortgage lending standards with cascading 
effects that threw millions out of work and wiped out the modest 
wealth of many low- and middle-income households. As one of its 
responses to the crisis, Congress created the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), which is charged with, among other things, 
devising regulations for banks and non-bank financial institutions that 
better protect individuals from unfair and abusive financial contracts.1   
The CFPB will have to make tough decisions.2 Although payday 
lenders, car title lenders, and other small-value, high-cost consumer 
finance firms, collectively commonly called “fringe” lenders, did not 
cause the financial crisis, the crisis made people acutely aware that not 
all debt contracts are individually or socially beneficial. Consequently, 
all types of subprime lending, which disproportionately go to low- and 
moderate-income individuals, are currently subject to heightened 
scrutiny. In the case of fringe lenders, there are two basic questions. 
First, does access to high-cost, small-value loans benefit borrowers? 
Second, do the regulations that govern fringe lenders need to be 
changed to improve transparency, to forbid certain contractual terms, 
or to make consumers more cognizant of potential pitfalls associated 
with the contracts?  
The Articles in this symposium tackle these issues. Several of the 
Articles address payday lending. Others examine related issues in title 
lending; bank overdraft protection (ODP) programs; small-value, short-
term lending outside the United States; and social and philosophical 
issues related to restrictions on free credit markets generally. A third 
set of Articles analyzes topics that are often not associated with small-
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College. 
 1. 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2011) (stating the purpose, objectives, and function of 
the CFPB). 
 2. Joseph Lynyak, Commentary: Advice for the CFPB Head, AM. BANKER, 
July 27, 2010, at 8 (describing the CFPB’s charged tasks as “Herculean”). 
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value subprime lending, but clearly should be, or arguably could be. 
Articles in this category cover peer-to-peer lending, government loans 
to students attending for-profit trade schools and colleges, and 
nonfinancial harms to families with excessive debt burdens. 
It is common for academics writing about fringe credit markets to 
avoid taking definitive stands on what government regulatory agencies 
should do, ducking the tough issues with the safe statement, “More 
research is needed.” The authors of the Articles in this symposium do 
not do that. Almost all take the bull by the horns and advocate specific 
regulations or regulatory approaches. Of course, the authors, who come 
from a variety of philosophical perspectives, advocate different policies. 
Some believe that if an individual freely agrees to borrow in a 
transparent credit contract it must be because this is the individual’s 
best option, and eliminating or restricting access to this alternative can 
only reduce the well-being of that person. Others argue that cognitive 
or behavioral flaws can lead people to make short-term decisions that 
are not in their long-term interest and the elimination or restriction of 
some options can raise people’s welfare. In the case of loans to attend 
for-profit schools, the loan contract itself may be transparent and fair, 
but the career benefits of the education it finances may not be.   
Regardless of where the authors stand in this debate, they are 
uniformly well-informed about the regulatory environment and the 
business operations in the credit markets they analyze. Readers of the 
Articles in this symposium will learn important institutional details 
related to fringe lending in nearly all its forms. 
In addition to providing a well-informed overview of the 
functioning of these credit markets, the Articles tackle a number of key 
themes that are critical to thinking about regulating high-cost 
consumer lending. In a short introduction, I cannot do justice to all of 
the important issues, but let me draw your attention to three basic 
questions that strike me as most important and pervasive in the 
symposium.  
The first key question is: Does access to payday lenders, or close 
alternatives, benefit or harm their customers? The majority of Articles 
in the symposium address this issue, some directly and others 
obliquely. Several of the Articles emphasize a closely related point: the 
customer base of fringe lenders is heterogeneous, so access to high-cost, 
short-term loans might benefit some while hurting others. Some 
customers, for example, might rationally use a payday loan after 
considering the benefits and costs of the loan and close alternatives. 
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Other customers might focus only on the short-term benefits without 
rationally weighing the costs. In the face of such heterogeneity, 
determining the net social benefit is a complex empirical challenge. 
One of the Articles takes a different angle to the population diversity 
issue. It asks: If it makes sense to ban high-cost, short-term loans to 
one major segment of the population, such as military personnel, why 
does it not make sense to extend this ban to the rest of the population?  
The second key question concerns how we should regulate 
businesses in the fringe economy. At an abstract level, this question is 
about whether there is an ideal set of limitations on the contractual 
terms or disclosures of payday lenders, peer-to-peer loan firms, bank 
ODP programs, title lenders, for-profit schools providing debt-financed 
educations, etc. Nearly all of the authors in this symposium take on 
this issue and, in doing so, also tackle a number of related practical 
questions, including:  
• Should regulations be at the federal, state, or local level, or 
all three?  
• Should high-cost consumer lenders be exempt from state 
laws if they are operated by Native American tribes? What 
if a tribe simply functions as a passive minority partner in 
a firm run by people who are not tribal members? 
• Should there be an umbrella regulatory agency or should 
various regulatory agencies take responsibility for 
different aspects of the businesses?  
• Should regulations focus on restricting contractual terms 
or should they try to address potential cognitive failures or 
information deficits among customers? If customers 
overestimate, for example, their probability of promptly 
repaying a loan, perhaps the lender should be required to 
inform potential clients of the typical number of loan 
renewals among its customers.  
The third key question is: What happens if high-cost consumer 
lending is legally prohibited or severely restricted? Can and will banks 
and credit unions provide similar credit services at a lower cost? Will 
informal-sector lenders, operating illegally, step up to provide banned 
high-cost, short-term consumer loans? Would it be a good use of limited 
law enforcement resources to try to prevent the emergence of such 
informal-sector lenders? And, would the informal-sector lenders look 
like the Hollywood version—tough thugs who threaten to break 
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kneecaps—or would they operate elusively over the Internet with no 
physical threats to customers who do not repay their loans?  
Beyond the high quality of the Articles and the authors’ efforts to 
address some or all of these three key themes, I was struck by another 
characteristic of the work: the great diversity in the methodological 
approaches to the issues. Not surprisingly, given the focus of the 
symposium and the legal background of most of the authors, several of 
the Articles contain nuanced analyses of existing legal and regulatory 
structures; how new financial products, which did not exist a decade or 
so ago, should fit into this environment; and how regulatory agencies 
should function within legal constraints. Other Articles depart 
dramatically from this approach. One, for example, draws lessons from 
a television drama intended to offer a realistic portrayal of 
communities of socially marginalized urban residents. Another is a 
careful econometric study of the effects of access to payday loans on 
populations within broad geographic areas. A third provides an 
historical analysis of the prevalence over time of illegal, high-cost, 
small-value lenders who employ physically coercive collection tactics. 
Yet another Article draws on the author’s own small-scale survey of 
title loan customers. And, as noted above, one of the Articles examines 
the operations of micro-lenders outside the United States to assess 
lessons they might provide for regulatory structures and fringe 
financial operations relevant to this country. 
Let me conclude by saying that I have followed the evolving fringe 
economy for over twenty years and have attended many conferences 
devoted to the topic, but this symposium stands out. As a group, the 
authors are strikingly well-informed about how these markets actually 
function, and the symposium includes eloquent and sincere exponents 
for vastly divergent views of what types of regulatory structures are 
likely to create the greatest social welfare. Readers will emerge with a 
solid knowledge of the fringe economy and will find persuasive 
arguments that challenge their initial perspectives.  
